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How Much Do Conditional Cash Transfers Increase the Utilization of
Maternal and Child Health Care Services? New Evidence from Janani
Suraksha Yojana in India
Mohammad Mahbubur Rahmana,∗, Saseendran Pallikadavatha
aSchool of Health Sciences & Social Work, University of Portsmouth, UK
Abstract
Janani Suraksha Yojana (safe motherhood scheme, or JSY) provides cash incentives to marginal pregnant
women in India conditional on having mainly institutional delivery. Using the fourth round of district level
household survey (DLHS-4), we have estimated its effects on both intended and unintended outcomes. Our
estimates of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from propensity score matching are remarkably
higher than those found in previous prominent studies using the second and third rounds of the survey
(DLHS-2 and DLHS-3). When we apply fuzzy regression discontinuity design exploiting the second
birth order, our estimates of local average treatment effect (LATE) are much higher than that of ATT. For
example, due to JSY, institutional delivery increases by around 16 percentage points according to ATT
estimate but about 23 percentage points according to LATE estimate.
Keywords: Janani Suraksha Yojana, Demand-side financing, Propensity score matching, India
JEL: I12, I15, I18
1. Introduction
One of the crucial challenges for policymakers of public health is to increase the utilization of mater-
nal and child health care (MCHC) services (Ki-Moon, 2010). For many years, they have tried to increase
that solely by increasing the supply of hospitals, doctors, nurses and machines. However, increasing their
supply is necessary but not sufficient under circumstances where many destitute women are financially
unable to access MCHC services (Bhatia et al., 2006; Bhatia and Gorter, 2007; Ensor and Cooper, 2004;
Koblinsky et al., 2006; Thaddeus and Maine, 1994). Over the last three decades, policy focus has shifted
to increase the demand for MCHC services by increasing the purchasing power of poor people. Since the
1990s, several developing countries have started conditional cash transfer programs, traditionally called
demand-side financing (DSF) programs, to increase the purchasing power of disadvantaged women (Ensor
et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2016; Kuwawenaruwa et al., 2016; Kingkaew et al., 2016; Engineer et al., 2016;
Skiles et al., 2015).
Policymakers are interested to know to what extent a DSF program plays a role in increasing the
utilization of MCHC services, as limited research studies, carried out in several developing countries, have
produced mixed findings (e.g., from no effect to high effect). For example, using regression discontinuity
design, De Brauw et al. (2011) found that El Salvador’s DSF program, Comunidades Solidarias Rurales,
increased skilled attendance at birth and institutional delivery by 12.5-17.8 and 15.3-22.8 percentage points
respectively, but had no effect on the uptake of antenatal and postnatal care services. A randomized
∗Corresponding author: E-mail address: mahbubur72@hotmail.com (Mohammad Mahbubur Rahman).
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controlled trial (RCT) in examining the impact of conditional cash payments to Honduran women, found
that such payments increased the coverage of antenatal care and well-child check-ups by 15-20 percentage
points, but had no effect on Measles and tetanus toxoid immunization (Morris et al., 2004). In another
experimental study, Barber and Gertler (2008) claimed that the Mexican conditional cash transfer program,
Oportunidades, increased the uptake of antenatal care service among rural women by 12.2 percentage
points. Propensity score matching (PSM) produced 10.7-17.8 percentage points increase in the utilization
of the facility birth in Nepal due to the Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (Powell-Jackson and Hanson,
2012). The Maternal Health Voucher Scheme in Bangladesh increased the utilization of at least three
antenatal care services by 13-13.7 percentage points and institutional delivery by 10.3-11 percentage points
while simple logit regressions were run (Ahmed and Khan, 2011).
In this study, we evaluate one of the world’s largest DSF programs, called Janani Suraksha Yojana
(safe motherhood scheme or JSY), which was launched in 2005 in India and currently covers more than 10
million women annually (MoHFW, 2017). Its main objective is to reduce maternal and child mortality as,
despite steady progress, India still has high maternal and child mortality rates. It mainly works to increase
the number of institutional deliveries as a way to acheive the objective, as maternal and child mortality rates
are higher among mothers delivering at home than among those delivering at health institutions. MCHC
services are insufficient in the case of deliveries at home, especially as emergency obstetric care services
are absent there. Its financial incentives also cover at least three antenatal care (ANC) services including
tetanus (TT) injection and iron folic acid (IFA), and at least one postnatal care (PNC) service for a mother
and her newborn. The program has drawn the attention of researchers globally and has been central to
gathering evidence on the effectiveness of a DSF program. Previous studies have examined its effects on
the directly intended outcomes such as institutional delivery, ANC and PNC (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015;
Carvalho et al., 2014; Gopalan and Durairaj, 2012; Gupta et al., 2011; Gupta et al., 2012; Lim et al.,
2010; Modugu et al., 2012), the indirectly or ultimate intended outcome – child mortality (Sengupta and
Sinha, 2018; Lim et al., 2010), and also a few unintended outcomes such as breastfeeding and childbirth
or pregnancy (Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015) and immunization (Carvalho
et al., 2014).1
Although there are several studies evaluating JSY, to the best of our knowledge, only five studies
(Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2010; Carvalho et al., 2014; Sen-
gupta and Sinha, 2018) dealt with the causality issue, by using PSM, inverse propensity score weighting,
instrumental variables (IV) regressions, district level Differences-in-Differences (DID) and the nationally
representative data. The first four studies used data from the repeated cross-section surveys – second
and third rounds of District Level Household Survey (DLHS-2 and DLHS-3) surveyed in 2002-2004 and
2007-2008 respectively, and Sengupta and Sinha (2018) used only DLHS-3. Both surveys were conducted
in each state of India, but DLHS-2 happened before the implementation of JSY, and DLHS-3 collected
data when JSY was in the initial stages of implementation and had not yet fully matured. Although JSY
was launched in 2005, its budget was released in 2006 and proper implementation was started in 2007
(Das et al., 2011). Many women in DLHS-3, who gave birth before 2007, were therefore classified as JSY
beneficiaries when they were not (Das et al., 2011). They were probably beneficiaries of other small-scale
programs which were run at state level (Das et al., 2011). As the treatment group included many untreated
women, those previous studies produced intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which have downward biases. As
1Institutional delivery, ANC and PNC can be considered as directly intended outcomes as the program, JSY, directly works
to increase the utilization of institutional delivery, ANC and PNC services. As the program’s ultimate goal is to reduce maternal
and child mortality by increasing the utilization of institutional delivery, ANC and PNC services, child mortality can be con-
sidered as the ultimate or indirectly intended outcome. As the program does not work to increase child birth and immunization,
they can be considered as unintended outcomes. The program has spillover effects on them.
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only the treatment group suffered from measurement errors in the treatment dummy, misclassifications
were not random. In this situation, even instrumental variables regression will not be able to remove such
biases. There were also selection biases, as many women did not know about the program at that time.
PSM or district level DID cannot remove endogeneity/selection biases. DID can only remove district level
heterogeneity. It cannot eliminate selection biases due to time-variant unobserved factors.
In this study, we have made several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, we use DLHS-4,
surveyed in 2013-2014, when JSY had matured and had been rolled out in all parts of India. Moreover,
DLHS-4 collected data on women who gave birth from 2008, and all deliveries fell into the time of JSY’s
proper implementation; hence there is less chance of systematic misclassifications of untreated women
as treated. Thus, we expect that unlike DLHS-2 and DLHS-3, DLHS-4 does not produce much deflated
causal effects. However, DLHS-4 also has a downside. Unlike DLHS-2 and DLHS-3, DLHS-4 is not a
nationally representative survey. It collected data from only low focus states (also called high performing
states).2 Hence our analysis is neither nationally representative nor externally valid for non-DLHS-4 states.
It should be noted that around two-thirds of Indian states are low focus states where JSY’s coverage was
higher in DLHS-4 than that in DLHS-3. Our results might be considered almost nationally representative.
Besides, some high performing states such as Nagaland and Tripura are very similar in socio-economic
conditions and the utilization of MCHC services to low performing states. We also produce state wise
results, and our results for Nagaland and Tripura can be very close to results for low performing states. We
think that severe misclassifications of untreated women as treated can be a bigger problem than not having
nationally representative data. For example, the true treatment effect of JSY on an outcome is a, and the
nationally representative data, DLHS-3, has produced the treatment effect as b, but DLHS-4 has produced
it as c. As misclassifications of untreated women as treated produce downward biases of treatment effects,
a − b will be positive. JSY is the universal program in low performing or high focus states, and it has
a greater effect on outcomes in these states than that in low focus states (Lim et al., 2010). As a is the
weighted average of treatment effects for two types of states, a− c will also be positive. Our point is that
a− b might be greater than a− c.
Secondly, we have used the PSM method rigorously. In addition to several other robustness checks
(e.g., randomization, overlapping and sensitivity analyses), we have checked endogeneity of JSY dummy
using Mantel and Haenszel (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) non-parametric test statistics. We have found no
evidence of endogeneity. However, such tests and the national roll-out of the program do not guarantee the
absence of endogeneity of the JSY dummy, as there can be self-selection biases or other selection biases.
There are always difficulties in finding suitable instruments. We tried fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD)
designs (e.g., IV regressions) exploiting the changes of eligibility for JSY at mother’s age 19 and birth
order 2. The discontinuity in the probability of treatment is found statistically insignificant when we
consider the age cutoff. Also, around the cutoff, there are few observations. We, therefore, ignore this
cutoff for FRD design. On the other hand, around the birth order cutoff, all observations are available,
and the cutoff produces discontinuity dummy and its interaction with the assignment variable as strong
instruments. We apply RFD design exploiting the birth order cutoff as a further robustness check, which
is our third contribution.
Fourthly, we have estimated the effects of JSY on all relevant intended outcomes such as any ANC
service, institutional delivery, any PNC service for mother and any PNC service for baby, and a long
list of unintended outcomes under the continuum of MCHC services such as individual ANC services
(e.g., blood pressure check, hemoglobin test, urine test etc.), individual PNC services (e.g., abdomen
2If the rate of institutional delivery is less than 25% in a state, that is called low-performing state; otherwise, high-forming
state.
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examination, breastfeeding advice, advice on infant diarrhoea etc.) and individual immunizations for baby
(e.g., BCG, Polio, DPT etc.). It should be noted that we consider individual ANC and PNC services as
unintended outcomes, as unlike TT injection and IFA, they are not directly targeted by JSY.
Fifthly, we have also estimated heterogeneous effects of JSY by time, state, wealth and health
institution. Because of economic growth, over time the utilization of MCHC services may increase among
the control women, and therefore JSY’s effects may reduce over time. Compared to advanced states, JSY
may have higher effects on backward states where the utilization of MCHC services is low. JSY should
have higher effects on the lower wealth group than the higher wealth group. JSY recipients may prefer
to go to the public health institutes rather than private ones because of lower costs of MCHC services,
and therefore JSY should have higher effects on women taking MCHC services from the public health
institutes. No other studies have estimated heterogeneous effects in such extensive forms.
After this introductory section, we discuss the program in Section 2, and Section 3 briefly explains
data. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 discusses key findings, and robust analyses are done
in Section 6. Section 7 discusses heterogeneous effects of the program, and Section 8 concludes the study.
2. Janani Suraksha Yojana
Although India has achieved the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on infant mortality by
reducing infant deaths by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015, it still accounts for 22 percent of 6.3 million
annual under-five deaths globally (Tandon, 2016). In spite of the steady decline in the maternal mortality
rate (e.g., 212 per 100,000 live births in 2007-2009 to 178 per 100,000 live births in 2010-2012), it remains
higher than that in some of its close competitors (Registrar General of India, 2013). On the other hand,
national figures show convincing improvements, but state wise India has high variations in maternal and
child mortality rates. Northern states have higher rates than southern states. For example, in 2010-2012,
the maternal mortality rate was 328 per 100,000 live births in Assam whilst it was 66 per 100,000 live
births in Kerala (Registrar General of India, 2013).
In the above circumstances, the prime minister of India launched JSY (“safe motherhood scheme”
in English) under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), on 12th April 2005, with the primary goal
of reducing maternal and neonatal mortality. To achieve this primary goal, JSY aims mainly to increase
the number of institutional deliveries. However, it provides cash to the eligible woman for not only the
institutional delivery but also for three ANC services including TT injection and IFA, and at least one PNC
service for her and her newborn.
There are 10 low performing states (LPS) – Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Rajasthan, Orissa, and Jammu and Kashmir – where the rates of institu-
tional delivery are low and thereby all pregnant women, who want to deliver their babies in public or
accredited private institutions, are eligible for JSY. In high performing states (HPS), the program cov-
ers only socio-economically disadvantaged women up to two births whose households have the “below
poverty line card”, or/and, scheduled caste affiliation, or/and, tribal affiliation. Also, they have to be 19
years or older and deliver in public or accredited private health institutions.3
There are field workers, called Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs), who identify eligible
women. However, their duties go beyond that (see Yojana, 2006). An ASHA also helps an eligible
pregnant woman, to register for three ANCs, to obtain the necessary certificates of the eligibility for JSY,
to identify a functional government health center or an accredited private health institution for referral
3The government withdrew birth order and age restrictions recently. However, such withdrawal does not affect our analysis,
because it happened after our data collection period.
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and delivery, to arrange the immunization for the newborn until the age of 14 weeks, to inform about the
birth or death of the child or mother to the auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM), and to arrange a postnatal
visit within 7 days of delivery. They also counsel them on having an institutional delivery, the initiation
of breastfeeding the newborn within one hour of birth and its continuance till 3-6 months and family
planning. They escort them to the pre-determined health center and stay there until the discharge.
In addition to regular salaries, ASHAs receive cash incentives to identify and assist eligible pregnant
women. Table (1) shows cash payments to both an ASHA and a qualified pregnant woman, by state type
(HPS and LPS) and location (rural and urban). In both kinds of states, both an ASHA and an eligible
pregnant woman in rural areas receive higher cash payments than those in urban areas. Cash payments
to an ASHA do not vary by state type, but cash payments to an eligible pregnant woman are higher in
LPS than in HPS. Differences in cash payments indicate that the government wants to encourage more
disadvantaged women to take up institutional delivery services.
Table 1: Scale of cash assistance under JSY (in Indian rupee (INR), and 64 INR=1 USD)
State Type
Rural Area Urban Area
Mother ASHA Total Mother ASHA Total
LPS 1,400 600 2,000 1,000 400 1,400
HPS 700 600 1,300 600 400 1,000
Source: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Annual Report 2016-2017 (MoHFW, 2017).
Both an ASHA and an eligible pregnant woman receive their entitled cash from the health institution
where the woman wants to deliver her baby. A public health institution pays the total entitled cash to the
eligible woman when she visits for the first time (before delivery) to be registered for three ANC services
and the institutional delivery. If she wants to deliver in an accredited private health institution, she receives
at least three-fourths (3/4) of the cash entitlement in the first visit for those registrations, and the rest at the
time of visit for the delivery. It should be noted that she will not receive any cash without registration. An
eligible woman also receives transportation costs of at least 250 rupees, which also varies with the location
and state. For caesarian section or obstetric complications, she receives additional cash up to 1,500 rupees.
If she wants to deliver at home, she receives only 500 rupees. An ASHA receives her cash entitlement in
two installments – first, when she visits the health institution with the pregnant woman for the first time,
and second, after the PNC service taken up by the pregnant woman.
5
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Table 2: JSY’s contribution to mean total delivery cost (in INR) estimated from the self reported delivery
costs of the pregnant women
Rural Area Urban Area
Health Delivery JSY Delivered by Delivery JSY Delivered by
Institution Cost Contribution JSY recipients Cost Contribution JSY recipients
Type (mean) (%) (%) (mean) (%) (%)
Public health institutions
Sub-health Center (SHC) 1388 50.42 3.05 1614 37.17 0.88
Primary Health Center (PHC) 2308 30.33 23.14 2104 28.52 11.19
Community Health Clinic (CHC) 2663 26.29 8.44 2460 24.39 8.03
United Health Care (UHC) 1453 48.18 1.62 3171 18.92 3.10
Sub-district/District Hospital (SDH/DH) 3161 22.15 47.43 2783 21.56 60.49
AYUSH Hospital/Clinic 3000 23.33 0.09 2000 30.00 0.06
Private health institutions
Dispensary/Clinic 6850 10.22 0.39 5000 12.00 0.25
Private Dispensary/Clinic 10008 6.99 0.51 9938 6.04 0.63
Private Hospital 8138 8.60 7.81 7738 7.75 12.77
Private AYUSH Hospital/Clinic 3000 23.33 0.06 4500 13.33
Non Government Organisation (NGO) 2017 34.71 0.18 0.13
Source: DLHS-4. It should be noted that DLHS-4 collected data from only HPS.
Note: To get JSY’s contributions (in percents) in the rural area, we have divided 700 (JSY’s cash transfer to the rural woman
in HPS) by averages of total delivery costs and then multiplied by 100. Similarly, we have divided 600 (JSY’s cash transfer
to the urban woman in HPS) by averages of total delivery costs in the urban area and then multiplied by 100, to get JSY’s
contributions (in percents) in the urban area.
It should be noted that JSY does not pay the cost of delivery, it just gives the entitled cash to
a pregnant woman. As a part of out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures, she has to expend that money on
her own for the delivery purpose. In general, her total OOP expenditures for the delivery are higher
than the cash she received from JSY. One can be interested to know how much JSY contributes to the
overall delivery cost (e.g., OOP expenditures) faced by a pregnant woman. In Table (2), we report the
average total delivery cost (in INR) estimated from the self-reported total delivery costs (e.g., out of
pocket expenditures) of pregnant women, by health institution type and location (rural-urban). In general,
mean delivery costs in the public health institutions are lower than those in private health institutions, and
therefore, JSY’s contribution to the mean delivery costs and delivery rates of JSY women are higher in
government facilities than in private ones. This scenario is the same in both rural and urban areas. The
mean delivery costs are least in the Sub-health Center, which is the lowest public health institution where
health facilities are inadequate. On the other hand, the delivery rates among JSY recipients are the highest
in sub-district or district hospitals (e.g., 47.43% in rural areas and 60.49% in urban areas), as they are the
top public health institutions, located in sub-district or district towns. However, compared to other public
health institutions, contributions of JSY to the mean delivery costs in these hospitals are low (e.g., 22.15%
in rural areas and 21.56% in urban areas). These numbers indicate that JSY may not only increase the
demand for institutional delivery services but also increase the demand for the quality of care.
3. Data
We have used data from the fourth (latest) round of a repeated cross-section survey named as dis-
trict level household survey (DLHS-4). However, it was surveyed in 2013-2014, on only eighteen high-
performing states, Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Telangana,
6
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Tripura, West Bengal, and three high-performing union territories, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
Chandigarh, and Puducherry, while the previous rounds of that survey collected data from all parts of
India. As we mentioned in the introduction, we have not used data from those rounds.
The DLHS-4 collected socioeconomic data from 378,487 households and their members, but for
collecting data on the utilization of MCHC services it surveyed 76,847 women (sample units of this study)
in the age group of 15-49 years whose last births happened in 2008 and onward. As proper implementation
of JSY started in 2007, all of those women should be included in our analyses. However, all women did
not respond to all survey questions used in this study. For example, in some MCHC outcomes, around
42,370 women responded. We also exclude women, who were recipients of other schemes, because those
schemes might have different eligibility criteria and different benefit packages. The number of excluded
women varies from 3,000 to 3,764 in different variables, but results of treatment effects differ only after
third or fourth decimal points.
Table (A.1) in Appendix A shows means of covariates, for JSY women (column (1)) and nonJSY
women (column (3)). These covariates are used as explanatory variables in the logit regressions of JSY
dummy, which are used to do PSM. The first three covariates on poverty status, scheduled caste status and
tribal status are dummy variables, which are the key selection/eligibility criteria set by the JSY administra-
tors. Mother’s (e.g, mother means a woman, who is our data unit) age and parity are continuous variables,
which are both eligibility criteria and self-selection criteria. Wealth index of a woman’s household is also
a continuous variable, which is mainly a self-selection criterion.4 As the poverty status has a high correla-
tion with wealth index, it can also be an eligibility criterion. Mother’s education and husband’s education
are also continuous variables and self-selection criteria. Hindu religion and rural location are dummies,
which are also self-selection criteria. Column (5) of the table shows differences in those means between
two groups of women, and column (6) shows p values of those differences. As p values are less than
0.0001 in all cases except tribal dummy, mean differences of covariates except tribal dummy are statisti-
cally and significantly different from 0 at 1% significance level. Statistically significant mean differences
imply that treated women are poorer than control women. We hope that after PSM, those differences will
be statistically insignificant. It should be noted that we have also used dummies for years of last deliveries
and state dummies as explanatory variables in the logit regressions of JSY dummy, to control time effects
and state heterogeneity respectively. We have not reported their summary statistics here.
Table (A.1) in Appendix A also shows observations of the treatment group (in column (2)) and the
control group (in column (4)). Although both treated and control observations vary with covariates, treated
women remain at around 21% of total observations. Sample sizes largely fall in the cases of mother’s
education and then her husband’s education. As any regression takes common samples of dependent and
independent variables, if we ignore these two covariates in logit regressions, sample sizes largely increase,
and results of treatment effects also largely increase. We therefore divide samples into two types such as:
Sample 1: It takes all covariates in Table (A.1) in Appendix A, and birth year dummies and state
dummies.
Sample 2: It ignores mother’s education and her husband’s education from Sample 1.
We compare results between these two sample groups. A substantial fall of control observations
(e.g., more than 3,000) is seen in the case of scheduled caste affiliation. That fall makes changes in results
of treatment effects after third or fourth decimal points. Besides, scheduled caste affiliation is one of the
4Wealth index is constructed by applying principal component analysis over a list of wealth of household – cooking fuel,
house type, number of dwelling rooms, electricity, house ownership, landholding, radio, television, computer, internet, tele-
phone, mobile phone, washing machine, refrigerator, sewing machine, watch, bicycle, motorcycle, car, tractor, tube well, cart
and air cooler.
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main eligibility criteria, so we include it in logit regressions. Slight variations of observations in other
covariates do not make any changes in results of treatment effects.
In Table (A.2) in Appendix A, we have presented summary statistics of MCHC services, outcome
variables, in a similar way to that in Table (A.1) in Appendix A. All variables are dummy variables, except
Days of first breast feeding, which is after how many days of birth a mother started breastfeeding her child.
The first four variables are intended outcomes included in the JSY benefit package, and JSY should have
direct positive effects on them. We see statistically significant differences in means of them between JSY
and nonJSY recipients, as p values are less than 0.0001. These imply that JSY might have positive effects
on them. Similarly, we expect that JSY has positive effects on all individual ANC services, PNC services
for mother, PNC services for baby except Days of first breast feeding and immunizations for baby. We
expect negative mean difference in the case of Days of first breast feeding, as a JSY recipient is expected
to start breastfeeding the child earlier than a nonJSY recipient. We also see negative mean differences in
advice on infant diarrhoea and pneumonia, which are unexpected. We should not fully rely on the results
presented here, as mean differences cannot be considered as causal effects.
Table (A.2) in Appendix A also shows treatment and control observations, which are not the same
in each outcome. However, in the case of five immunization dummies (BCG, POLIO, first POLIO, DPT,
and Measles), observations are remarkably lower than that of all other outcomes. We also divide outcomes
into two types, such as:
Outcome type 1: Excluding BCG, POLIO, first POLIO, DPT and Measles, it consists of all other
outcomes in Table (A.2) in Appendix A.
Outcome type 2: It consists of BCG, POLIO, first POLIO, DPT and Measles.
Although to estimate treatment effects we run separate logit regressions for each outcome, logit
regressions’ results will remain almost the same in an outcome type, as sample sizes are similar. The
above divisions of outcomes help us to show logit regressions’ results, covariates balancing and overlap
conditions in generalized ways. Otherwise, we are supposed to show them for each outcome, and such
shows would make the paper clumsy as we have a long list of outcomes.
4. Methodology
4.1. Identification of Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
Let y1 be the outcome of a woman (e.g., a binary variable of having institutional delivery) with a
treatment status (e.g., with JSY) and y0 the outcome with a control status (e.g., without JSY). It should be
noted that a woman cannot be in both statuses in a single point of time, and we assume that the treatment
of woman i affects only the outcome of woman i (e.g., Stable Unit Treatment Value Addition (SUTVA)
assumption). However, for the time being, we consider that both y1 and y0 are available for randomly
selected woman i in a single point of time. Then, one way of estimating the treatment/causal effect is the
average treatment effect (ATE) defined as,
τate ≡ E(y1 − y0), (1)
which averages across all women including those who did not receive JSY benefits.
Now, let w be a binary treatment indicator, where w = 1 denotes treatment status (e.g., with JSY)
and w = 0 the control status (e.g., without JSY). Then, another way of estimating causal effect is the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) defined as,
τatt ≡ E(y1 − y0|w = 1), (2)
8
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which is the mean effect for those who actually participated in the program. Although ATE and ATT are
generally different, they are equivalent in some special cases.
Now, we assume that treatment depends on observables. Let X denote a vector of observed covari-
ates. To identify ATE, the following assumption should be satisfied,
Assumption 1 (ignorability): Conditional on X , w and (y0, y1) are independent.
The above assumption is called ignorability or unconfoundedness or simply conditional independence. It
implies that a woman given her socioeconomic status does not tell a lie about her outcomes with and with-
out treatment statuses, to get a selection from the program. It has a better chance of holding when the set
of control variables, X , is richer. From this point, the violation of the assumption implies that X did not
include all possible control variables, and there is a chance of an endogeneity problem (e.g., endogeneity
of w as some variables are left unobserved in the error term). However, another source of violation occurs
when one includes variables in X that can themselves be affected by treatment. The ignorability assump-
tion implies the following ignorability in mean assumption,
Assumption 1′ (ignorability in mean): (a) E(y0|X,w) = E(y0|X); (b) E(y1|X,w) = E(y1|X).
If assumption 1′ is satisfied, ATE and ATT conditional on X are identical. More precisely, define
τate(X) = E(y1 − y0|X) (3)
τatt(X) = E(y1 − y0|X,w = 1) = E(y1 − y0|X). (4)
And, from the iterated expectation, we can write unconditional ATE and ATT as
τate = E[τate(X)] = τatt. (5)
If assumptions 1 and 1′ are satisfied, we can identify ATE and ATT in equations (3) and (4). To identify
them in equation (5), in addition to assumptions 1 and 1′, we will require being able to observe both
control and treated women at every value of X . In other words, the following overlap assumption needs
to be held,
Assumption 2 (overlap): For all X , 0 < p(w = 1|X) < 1,
where p(w = 1|X) is called the propensity score, and the assumption implies that the propensity score
can never be zero or one.
4.2. Estimation of ATE and ATT using Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
If the above identification conditions are satisfied, we can estimate consistent estimators of τate
and τatt in several ways, such as simple regression adjustment, propensity score methods and matching
methods. Although there is no clear superiority of one method over others, we use here a popular matching
method named as propensity score matching (PSM).
For each woman i, we can impute values for the counterfactuals, yi0 and yi1, using matching. Let yˆi0
and yˆi1 denote the imputed values, and yˆi0 = yi when wi = 0 and yˆi1 = yi when wi = 1. But when wi = 0,
yˆi1 should be imputed by taking the closest match(es) from the treated units, and vice versa. After having
imputed values, we can estimate τate and τatt by simply using the mean difference method as follows,
τˆate = N
−1
N∑
i=1
(yˆi1 − yˆi0) (6)
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τˆatt = N
−1
1
N∑
i=1
wi(yi − yˆi0), (7)
where N is the number of both treated and control women and N1 is the number of only treated women.
Abadie and Imbens (2006) suggested to find the closest match(es) based on covariates, X , but
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed to find the closest match(es) based on propensity scores estimated
from running a logit model. However, matching based on propensity scores complicates the estimation of
the bootstrapped standard errors. A different function of the propensity score, such as the log-odds ratio,
reduces the complication. We use the log-odds ratio to do matching and estimate bootstrapped standard
errors. A matched counterfactual is chosen based on the nearest neighbor or the M number of the nearest
neighbors of the log-odds ratio. We choose the third nearest neighbors option. However, in the robust
analysis section, we check the sensitivity of our main results for different matching methods and different
sets of covariates in X . It should be noted that we only estimate ATTs in all cases, not ATEs.
Matching is motivated by the thought experiment. It is just the sample analog of the thought experi-
ment. For example, we draw a value X from the distribution of covariates in the population. Then, for the
given X , we randomly draw a treated woman and a control woman, and thu we estimate yˆi1 and yˆi0. In
this way, for all randomly selectedX values, we estimate τˆate and τˆatt. Thus, given the above identification
conditions, a matching method can give us estimates of τˆate and τˆatt close to that found in experimental
studies.
Although the above identification conditions are difficult to test, we test them to some extent by
using the conventional ways. For example, we test the ignorability condition by using Mantel and Haenszel
non-parametric test statistics (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959), which suggest that the condition is satisfied.
However, we do not rule out the chance of endogeneity of wi. To control the endogeneity problem, we use
the fuzzy regression discontinuity design (FRDD) as a further robustness check. We also test the overlap
condition. Simple density plots of the propensity scores of treatment and control women imply that both
groups of women do not sufficiently overlap in each value of X . To keep those women who overlap, we
drop some observations outside of 0.10 < p(wi = 1|X) < 0.90, as suggested by Crump et al. (2009). We
also check whether biases of covariates between the treated and control units become insignificant after
matching.
5. Results
For each outcome, we run two separate logit regressions of JSY dummy (1 if a woman participated
in JSY program, 0 if not) on ovariates under samples 1 and 2 and then use the third nearest neighbors
of log-odds ratios, estimated from two logit regressions, to impute counterfactual outcomes and estimate
two ATTs utilizing the formula in equation (7). An estimation of ATT takes the common observations of
the outcome variable and all variables used in the logit regression. Therefore, an estimation of the logit
regression also considers those common observations. If the number of common observations varies, re-
sults of the logit model with the same specification may differ. As some of our outcomes have different
sample sizes, different logit regressions for them may produce different results. We do not show pairs of
logit regressions (using two sets of covariates in samples 1 and 2) for all outcomes as they are too numer-
ous. However, as different outcomes in an outcome group have the same or close sample sizes, separate
logit regressions using the same covariates produce identical or similar results. We choose institutional
delivery from outcome type 1 and BCG from outcome type 2 as representative outcomes of two outcome
groups so that we can show four representative logit models for two outcome groups. In Appendix Ta-
ble (A.3), we report four logit regressions with changes in log-odds ratios due to changes in covariates
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excluding state dummies and birth year dummies. We see that, in each logit regression, two main selec-
tion criteria (poverty and scheduled caste) have the highest effects on the log-odds ratios, as expected. In
the cases of all other reported covariates, changes in log-odds ratios also have expected signs and magni-
tudes. Although most of the reported covariates’ parameters do not show clear patterns among four logit
regressions, poverty effects become stronger with the increase in sample size in those regressions. In the
following subsections, the effects of JSY on outcomes listed in Table (A.2) are discussed.
5.1. Main Outcomes Under the JSY Benefit Package
Table (3) shows results of ATTs for four main outcomes, with bootstrapped standard errors, by
samples 1 and 2. All results are statistically significant, and estimates of ATTs are higher in sample 2
than in sample 1. With the increase in sample sizes, estimates of ATTs become closer to raw estimates
(e.g., mean differences) shown in Table (A.2) in Appendix A. The main reason for increasing ATTs with
the increase in sample sizes is that the proportion of poorer women rises in the control group and thereby
the means of outcomes of the control group fall. As expected, JSY has the highest positive effects on
institutional delivery. JSY increases institutional delivery by 12.5 percentage points with sample 1 and 15.7
percentage points with sample 2. The second highest effects are estimated on at least one PNC for mother,
which are 10.1 percentage points with sample 1 and 12.2 percentage points with sample 2, as the values of
ATTs are 0.101 and 0.122 respectively. The third and fourth highest effects are estimated on at least one
ANC and at least one PNC for baby respectively. It should be noted that Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) got
a statistically insignificant effect on at least three ANC services, but we get statistically significant effects
on at least one ANC. We also got statistically significant effects on at least three ANC services, which are
0.100 with sample 1 and 0.115 with sample 2 (not shown here). These results are clearly higher than those
found by Powell-Jackson et al. (2015). Our other results are also remarkably higher than those found by
Powell-Jackson et al. (2015). These imply that the previous study got downward biased results, as we
mentioned earlier.
Table 3: Effects of JSY on the utilization of main MCHC services
Sample 1 Sample 2
Bootstrap Bootstrap
ATT S.E. N ATT S.E. N
At least one ANC 0.079*** (0.004) 54,659 0.101*** (0.005) 68,531
Institutional delivery 0.125*** (0.005) 54,656 0.157*** (0.005) 68,527
At least one PNC for mother 0.101*** (0.006) 54,655 0.122*** (0.006) 68,527
At least one PNC for baby 0.070*** (0.006) 54,588 0.086*** (0.006) 68,429
Note: We impute values of the above four outcomes of the counterfactual groups using third nearest neighbors of log-odds
ratios estimated from the logit regressions of JSY dummy on covariates under sample 1 and sample 2. We then estimate ATTs
for these outcomes applying the formula in equation (7). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001.
5.2. ANC Services
Table (4) shows values of ATTs for individual MCHC services by samples 1 and 2. We estimate
them with bootstrapped standard errors in a similar way to the previous four outcomes in Table (3). All
ATTs are statistically significant, and ATTs with sample 2 are higher than those with sample 1. If we
look at individual ANC services, we see that JSY has the highest effects on IFA and TT injection (e.g.,
their values of ATTs are 0.104 and 0.097 with sample 1, and 0.125 and 0.117 with sample 2). They
are not surprising results, as IFA and TT injection are included in the JSY benefit package. They are
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intended outcomes, but all other individual MCHC services are unintended outcomes (e.g., not directly
targeted by JSY). Large increases are also seen in the uptake of weight measure, blood pressure check,
haemoglobin test, blood group test, abdomen examination and urine test due to JSY, as their values of
ATTs are reasonably high. We see the relatively lower increases in the uptake of height measure, breast
examination and ultrasound. One can say that women have a high demand for those ANC services, which
include crucial medical check-ups at the time of pregnancy.
5.3. PNC Services for Mother
The second panel of Table (4) shows results of ATTs for individual PNC services for mother by
samples 1 and 2. In each sample group, ATTs are close to each other and have moderate sizes. However,
as we see in Table (A.2), the utilization of PNC services for mother is very low without a program like
JSY. If we consider this fact, the role of JSY in uplifting their usage cannot be regarded as great. As we
have seen in ANC services, their utilization has already been very high with no program, and JSY further
improves their usage at rates, which can be appreciated. Abdominal examination has the same values
of ATTs in both PNC and ANC. Advice on breastfeeding and baby care may seem to be PNC services
for baby, but they can also be considered as a part of PNC services for mother. The most important
point is that JSY increases advice on family planning, which may increase the actual utilization of family
planning services. This finding is opposite to the findings from Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) and Nandi
and Laxminarayan (2016) who found that JSY increases the childbirth or pregnancy rate. It may be that
childbirth increases in the short term, but it may ultimately decrease in the long term.
5.4. PNC Services for Baby
By samples 1 and 2, the results of ATTs for PNC services for baby, with bootstrapped standard
errors, are shown in the third panel of Table (4). Due to JSY, measurement of baby’s weight at the
time of birth increases by 10.6 and 13.6 percentage points (under samples 1 and 2 respectively), which
can be regarded as high. As expected earlier, JSY has a negative effect on days of first breastfeeding.
JSY recipients start breastfeeding their newborns 0.088 and 0.086 days (under sample1 and sample 2
respectively) earlier than the control women. Advice on infant diarrhoea and pneumonia now show the
expected positive signs, as opposed to negative raw differentials in Table (A.2) in Appendix A.
5.5. Immunizations for Baby
Child immunizations are entirely outside of JSY’s benefits package. JSY is supposed not to have
any effect on them. However, field workers or ASHAs encourage JSY recipients to take immunizations for
their babies. Further, women may be educated about vaccinations when they come to health facilities for
institutional deliveries. We can then expect positive effects of JSY on immunizations, but such results will
be low. By samples 1 and 2, estimates of ATTs for immunizations for baby, with bootstrapped standard
errors, are shown in the fourth panel of Table (4). JSY has relatively higher effects on the usage of
Hepatitis-B (7.6 and 9.4 percentage points under samples 1 and 2 respectively), Vitamin-A (7.2 and 8.0
percentage points under samples 1 and 2 respectively) and first polio within two weeks of birth (4.7 and
6.0 percentage points under samples 1 and 2 respectively), but low effects on the usage of BCG, Measles,
DPT and polio.
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Table 4: Effects of JSY on the utilization of individual MCHC services
Sample 1 Sample 2
Bootstrap Bootstrap
ATT S.E. N ATT S.E. N
ANC services
Weight measured 0.089*** (0.005) 54,622 0.110*** (0.005) 68,491
Height measured 0.062*** (0.008) 54,622 0.069*** (0.006) 68,491
Blood pressure checked 0.093*** (0.006) 54,622 0.114*** (0.005) 68,491
Blood tested (haemoglobin) 0.088*** (0.007) 54,622 0.108*** (0.006) 68,491
Blood tested (blood group) 0.088*** (0.006) 54,622 0.099*** (0.006) 68,491
Urine tested 0.090*** (0.006) 54,622 0.107*** (0.005) 68,491
Abdomen examined 0.083*** (0.008) 54,622 0.091*** (0.008) 68,491
Breast examined 0.044*** (0.005) 54,622 0.048*** (0.006) 68,491
Ultrasound done 0.058*** (0.007) 54,622 0.072*** (0.007) 68,491
Iron Folic Acid tablet/syrup 0.104*** (0.008) 54,659 0.125*** (0.006) 68,531
At least one tetanus injection 0.097*** (0.005) 54,650 0.117*** (0.005) 68,521
PNC services for mother
Abdomen examined 0.083*** (0.006) 54,650 0.090*** (0.007) 68,517
Advice on breastfeeding 0.085*** (0.006) 54,650 0.089*** (0.007) 68,517
Advice on baby care 0.078*** (0.005) 54,650 0.085*** (0.007) 68,517
Advice on Family Planning 0.076*** (0.007) 54,650 0.081*** (0.006) 68,517
PNC services for baby
Weight taken at birth 0.106*** (0.004) 54,586 0.136*** (0.004) 68,427
Days of first breastfeeding -0.088*** (0.012) 54,579 -0.086*** (0.011) 68,418
Advice on infant diarrhoea 0.038*** (0.007) 54,648 0.041*** (0.007) 68,517
Advice on infant pneumonia 0.034*** (0.005) 54,654 0.034*** (0.005) 68,526
Immunizations for baby
BCG 0.024*** (0.004) 30,366 0.026*** (0.003) 38,326
Polio 0.020*** (0.004) 30,368 0.016*** (0.003) 38,327
First Polio in two weeks of birth 0.047*** (0.008) 30,371 0.060*** (0.007) 38,330
DPT 0.037*** (0.007) 30,366 0.043*** (0.007) 38,326
Measles 0.037*** (0.007) 30,365 0.045*** (0.006) 38,325
Hepatitis-B 0.076*** (0.006) 54,326 0.094*** (0.005) 68,091
Vitamin-A 0.072*** (0.007) 54,332 0.080*** (0.006) 68,096
Note: We impute values of the above outcomes of the counterfactual groups using third nearest neighbors of log-odds ratios
estimated from the logit regressions of JSY dummy on covariates under sample 1 and sample 2. We then estimate ATTs for
these outcomes applying the formula in equation (7). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001.
6. Robust Analysis
6.1. Whether Covariates are Balanced
If covariates are not randomly distributed between treatment and control groups, estimates of ATTs
in the previous section are not valid. Randomization means that covariates are balanced between two
groups. Covariates balancing usually means that means of covariates in treatment and control groups
are statistically the same. However, a good way of checking covariates balancing is to check whether
percentage biases in covariates between two groups are near zero or between -10 and +10 (see Thomas,
2003). In Figure (A.1) in Appendix A, we plot percentage biases in all covariates including state dummies
and birth year dummies, between two groups. After running each representative logit model in Table (A.3)
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in Appendix A, we estimate biases in covariates used in that logit model, with and without matching.
Thus, we plot eight sets of biases in the cases of four logit models. Biases usually vary between matched
and unmatched cases. They may also be different in four logit models because of large differences in
sample sizes. In each case/subfigure, the horizontal axis represents biases and the vertical axis represents
covariates but they are not seen because of the long list, and black filled dots present percentage biases in
the unmatched case, and crosses indicate percentage biases after matching. In each subfigure, we see that
percentage biases drastically reduce after matching, and they are now close to zero, and also fall between
-10 and +10, so we can say that covariates are balanced between the treatment and control groups, and our
results in the previous section are not biased due to a covariates balancing issue.
6.2. Whether the Overlap Condition is Satisfied
The validity of estimates of ATTs can be questioned again if the overlap condition is violated.
When an estimated density of the propensity score (pscore), Pr(JSY = 1|X), estimated from the logit
regression of JSY dummy on covariates (X), has too much mass around 0 or 1, then there can be an
indication of the violation of the condition (see Busso et al., 2014). After running each logit model in
Table (A.3) in Appendix A, we estimate propensity scores for treatment and control groups. In Figure
(A.2) in Appendix A, we plot their densities in the cases of four logit models. The long dash-dot lines
represent the treatment group, and the solid lines represent the control group. In the case of the control
group, the solid lines have too much probability mass near 0. We can say that there is evidence of violating
the overlap assumption.
Table 5: Effects of JSY on the utilization of main MCHC services with reduced samples (the propensity
score≥ 0.10)
Sample 1 Sample 2
Bootstrap Bootstrap
ATT S.E. N ATT S.E. N
At least one ANC 0.076*** (0.004) 43,260 0.097*** (0.004) 54,352
Institutional delivery 0.127*** (0.005) 43,257 0.147*** (0.005) 54,349
At least one PNC for mother 0.103*** (0.006) 43,258 0.121*** (0.007) 54,350
At least one PNC for baby 0.067*** (0.007) 43,202 0.082*** (0.006) 54,271
Note: We impute values of the above four outcomes of the counterfactual groups using third nearest neighbors of log-odds
ratios estimated from the logit regressions of JSY dummy on covariates under sample 1 and sample 2. We then estimate ATTs
for these outcomes applying the formula in equation (7). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001.
To satisfy the overlap assumption, Crump et al. (2009) have suggested dropping observations if
the propensity score is below 0.10 and above 0.90 and to estimate treatment effects again with reduced
samples. If we look at Figure (A.2), almost all propensity scores are less than 0.80. So, by samples 1 and
2, we re-estimate ATTs for only main outcomes if the propensity scores, estimated from two representative
logit models for outcome type 1, are greater than or equal to 0.10. Table (5) shows re-estimated values of
ATTs for main outcomes, with reduced samples. Results are very close to those shown in Table (3). These
imply that the overlap condition is not severely failed in the cases of samples 1 and 2.
6.3. Whether the Unconfoundedness/Ignorability Condition is Satisfied
Violation of the unconfoundedness/ignorability assumption means the existence of an endogeneity
problem and thus implies that our results in the previous section are biased. There is a chance of an
endogeneity problem, as some women were selected for JSY based on unobserved factors. For example,
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some women probably had a good connection with ASHAs or field workers, and therefore, they were well
aware of the program and its selection procedures.
Although unconfoundedness is untestable from the statistical ground, there are some ways to get a
flavor of whether it exists in data. Rosenbaum et al. (1987) suggested dividing the control group into two
groups. One control group is the group of eligible non-participants, and another control group includes
ineligibles. If average values of outcomes are statistically and significantly different between these two
groups, then this assumption might be violated. In our case, we consider those women in the control
group as the eligible non-participants whose households have a below poverty line card or scheduled caste
affiliation or tribal affiliation, and who have had less than three births. All other women in the control group
are considered as ineligibles. We make a dummy variable by giving 1 to the eligible non-participants, and
0 to the ineligibles. If we run separate OLS regressions of all outcomes on this dummy, we get the
coefficients of the dummy, which are differences in means of outcomes between two control groups (e.g.,
raw differentials). In Table (A.4) in Appendix A, we are supposed to present raw differentials. However,
eligible non-participants and ineligibles are likely to have different socio-economic characteristics, and
there is a chance that differences in mean outcomes between the two control groups are due to differences
in mean covariates between two groups.
We run separate OLS regressions of outcomes on that dummy of two control groups plus all of
our covariates in samples 1 and 2. Columns (1) and (4) of Table (A.4) in Appendix A show the coeffi-
cients of the dummy, and p values estimated from robust standard errors are in columns (2) and (5) of
the table. We see that, after controlling covariates, means of most of the outcomes are statistically and
significantly different between two control groups. Thus, it can be said that there is a chance of violating
unconfoundedness assumption in the cases of both samples.
Aakvik (2001) and Rosenbaum (2002) proposed the bounding approach to check unonconfounded-
ness. For binary outcomes, they suggested the Mantel and Haenszel non-parametric test statistics (Mantel
and Haenszel, 1959). In Table (A.5) in Appendix A, for four main intended outcomes, by samples 1 and
2, we present the upper bounds, Qmh+, with the assumption of the overestimation of the treatment effects
due to unobserved factors and the lower bounds, Qmh−, with the assumption of the underestimation of the
treatment effects due to unobserved factors, with their associated p values of statistical significance, pmh+
and pmh−, at different levels of γ. p values imply whether we can reject the assumptions of overestimation
and underestimation. In most of the cases, both pmh+ and pmh− have zero values, which imply that we
can reject the null hypotheses of both overestimation and underestimation due to unobserved factors. The
bounding approach says that there is no strong evidence of violating the unconfoundedness/ignorability
assumption. This is also true for higher values of γ, which are not shown.
6.4. Whether Results are Sensitive to the Different Specifications of the Logit Model
Now, we check whether ATTs for four main outcomes vary to the different specifications of the logit
model (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). We consider five sets of covariates, named as covariates1, covariates2,
covariates3, covariates4 and covariates5, and we run five separate logit regressions of JSY dummy using
these five sets of covariates. Covariates1 includes the main selection criteria – whether a household has
a below poverty line card or schedule caste affiliation or tribal affiliation, and birth order – which were
set by the program administrators. Covariates2 includes covariates1 plus some self-selection criteria listed
in Table (A.1), such as, current age of mother, wealth index of mother’s household, whether woman’s
religion is hindu, and whether woman lives in a rural area. In covariates3, state dummies are added with
covariates2, and birth year dummies are added with covariates3 to make covariates4, which is basically
sample 2. Covariates5 includes covariates4 plus district dummies. It should be noted that Powell-Jackson
et al. (2015) and Nandi and Laxminarayan (2016) considered district level heterogeneity in their analyses.
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We also check here whether our results change due to the district level fixed effect. None of the five sets of
covariates includes mother’s education or her husband’s education, as they drastically drop observations.
Here we are interested in showing how much results are changed due to different specifications of the logit
model, given closer sample sizes in those specifications.
In Table (6), for main outcomes, estimates of ATTs under the different choices of covariates in the
logit regression are presented. ATTs are estimated here in the same way as in the previous section, but
for the different specifications of the logit model. Results here are comparable with Table (3)’s results
under sample 2, because of closer sample sizes. For the first set of covariates in covariates1, results are
very different from those in Table (3) (also shown in column (4) of Table (6)). In the case of the second
set of covariates in covariates2, results are slightly higher than we found before. In the case of the last
three sets of covariates, the results are similar (see columns (3), (4) and (5) of the table). They imply that
district-level heterogeneity or time effects do not affect our results much. In other words, our previous
results are robust.
Table 6: Effects of JSY on the utilization of main MCHC services, under different specifications of the
logit regression
Covariates1 Covariates2 Covariates3 Covariates4 Covariates5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
At least one ANC 0.024 0.127*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.082***
(0.051) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
[N=68,567] [N=68,543] [N=68,543] [N=68,531] [N=68,522]
Institutional delivery 0.382*** 0.177*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.147***
(0.058) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
[N=68,563] [N=68,539] [N=68,539] [N=68,527] [N=68,518]
At least one PNC for mother -0.002 0.127*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.115***
(0.065) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
[N=68,563] [N=68,539] [N=68,539] [N=68,527] [N=68,518]
At least one PNC for baby 0.141** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.074***
(0.059) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
[N=68,465] [N=68,441] [N=68,441] [N=68,429] [N=68,420]
Note: Estimates of ATTs are shown with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and numbers of observations in brackets.
* p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01. Covariates1 includes program administrators’ selection criteria – poor, schedule caste,
tribe, birth order. Covariates2 includes covariates1 plus self-selection criteria excluding woman’s education and her husband’s
education. In covariates3, state dummies are added with covariates2, and birth year dummies are added with covariates3 to
make covariates4. Covariates5 includes covariates4 plus district dummies.
6.5. Whether Results are Sensitive to the Different Choices of Matching Methods
We check here whether estimates of ATTs are sensitive to the different choices of matching tech-
niques, such as one-to-one matching (first nearest neighbor), radius matching, kernel matching, local linear
regression matching and spline matching (Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016). We keep the specification of
the logit model the same as we specified using covariates in sample 2 in the previous section or covariates4
in the previous subsection. In Table (7), for main outcomes, we see that the results are not very sensitive
to the different matching techniques.
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Table 7: Effects of JSY on the utilization of main MCHC services, under different matching techniques
One-to-One Radius Kernel Local linear regression Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
At least one ANC [N=68,531] 0.100*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.101***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Institutional delivery [N=68,527] 0.154*** 0.165*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
At least one PNC for mother [N=68,527] 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.121***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
At least one PNC for baby [N=68,429] 0.084*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Note: Estimates of ATTs are shown with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01. To
estimate above ATTs, we use covariates in sample 2.
6.6. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) Design – Instrumental Variables (IV) Regressions
Although the Mantel and Haenszel non-parametric test statistics (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) en-
sure that the unconfoundedness/ignorability assumption is not violated, there is always doubt about the
endogeneity of the treatment dummy as there can always be selection bias. We apply here FRD design
exploiting the policy change of JSY at birth order 2 (e.g., a woman is eligible for JSY up to her second
birth). The IV technique exists when the probability of treatment is discontinuous and/or kinked at the
cutoff, but the discontinuity size is less than 1 and greater than 0. It estimates the local average treatment
effect (LATE) for the compliers under the local randomization and monotonicity assumptions, and there-
fore, estimates of LATEs can be very different from estimates of ATEs and ATTs (Imbens and Angrist,
1994).
Before going to further analysis, Table (8) shows the observations we have at each birth order.
We see that most of the women belong up to the second birth order, and observations drastically fall
from 27,256 at birth order 2 to 11,352 at birth order 3, implying the violation of the local randomization
assumption (McCrary, 2008). The zero birth order should not exist here because the survey was conducted
on those women who gave birth before the survey. This implies that there are measurement errors in birth
order. The FRD design corrects biases of treatment effects raised from these errors. We produce results
considering the birth order from 1 to 7, and in this way, some observations are lost. Although this range
is chosen on an ad-hoc basis, our results do not vary significantly with different bandwidths. For discrete
forcing variable, the methods for choosing the optimal bandwidth, such as cross-validation method of
Ludwig and Miller (2007) and squared error method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), do not work.
In Figure (1), we plot the probability of participating in JSY against the birth order. Scatter points
are means of JSY dummy at different birth orders. The line is estimated from the local linear regression
allowing different slopes at either side of the cutoff, 2. The line and scatter points imply that there is a little
discontinuity but a clear kink in the probability of participating in JSY at the cutoff. Similarly, we plot four
main outcomes in Figure (2). They do not show any remarkable discontinuities, but they have similar kinks
at the cutoff as we found kinks in the probability of participating in JSY. Causal relationships between JSY
and those outcomes exist mainly through kinks, not through jumps. We should not rule out that kinks in
outcomes may happen due to kinks in covariates (excluding birth order), used in the previous analyses,
not kinks in JSY. We have found that there are kinks in most of the covariates (not shown here), which
again imply the violation of the local randomization assumption. In this situation, we have to control these
covariates to get unbiased results.
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Table 8: Number of observations in each birth order
Birth order Freq. Percent Cum.
0 12 0.02 0.02
1 26,201 36.09 36.11
2 27,256 37.55 73.66
3 11,352 15.64 89.30
4 4,399 6.06 95.36
5 1,863 2.57 97.92
6 862 1.19 99.11
7 334 0.46 99.57
8 170 0.23 99.80
9 78 0.11 99.91
10 45 0.06 99.97
11 8 0.01 99.98
12 6 0.01 99.99
13 2 0 100
14 2 0 100
17 1 0 100
Total 72,591 100
Note: We show discontinuity and kink in the probability of participating in the program, JSY, at birth order 2. Scatter point in
each birth order is the mean of JSY dummy. From birth order 1 to 7, line is estimated from the local linear regression allowing
different slopes in either side of the cutoff. We clearly see that JSY has both (small) discontinuous and kinked relationship with
birth order.
Figure 1: Jump and kink in the probability of participating in the program, JSY, at birth order 2
Note: We show discontinuities and kinks in the probabilities of having at least one ANC service, institutional delivery service,
at least one PNC service for mother and at least one PNC service for baby, at birth order 2. Scatter points in each birth order are
means of those respective variables. From birth order 1 to 7, lines are estimated from local linear regressions allowing different
slopes in either side of the cutoff. We clearly see that those four variables have kinked relationship (rather than discontinuous)
with birth order.
Figure 2: Jumps and kinks in the probabilities of having four main MCHS services, at birth order 2
We consider both jumps and kinks when we run regressions. In Table (9), we first run local linear
(OLS) regressions of JSY dummy and four outcomes on z=1[Birth order≤2], z× (Birth order-2) and
(Birth order-2) within birth order 1 and 7. The goodness of fit test suggested by Lee and Card (2008)
does not allow us to consider any polynomial term of (Birth order-2). The coefficients of z and z× (Birth
order-2) from local linear regressions, which are estimates of discontinuities and kinks respectively, are
shown under the ‘without covariates’ option. Other coefficients from the regressions are not shown. The
size of discontinuity in the probability of participating in JSY is 0.069, but apart from institutional delivery
and PNC for mother, those outcomes have almost zero and statistically insignificant discontinuities. In the
cases of four outcomes, the sizes of kinks (changes in slopes) are much higher than those of jumps, but in
the case of JSY, the jump size is slightly higher than the kink size. All kinks are statistically significant.
When we add all other covariates under sample 2 in the local linear regression of JSY dummy, the size
of discontinuity in the probability of participating in JSY increases from 0.069 to 0.087, but the size
of kink remains almost the same. After adding those covariates in the local linear regressions of four
outcomes, discontinuities in outcomes remain almost the same in most of the cases, but kinks in outcomes
dramatically fall implying that covariates explain most of the kinks in outcomes.
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Table 9: Estimated results of discontinuities, kinks and LATEs exploiting birth order 2
At least Institutional At least one At least one
JSY one ANC delivery PNC for mother PNC for baby
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Without covariates
OLS regression
z=1[Birth order≤2] 0.069*** 0.006 0.029** 0.019** 0.020
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
z× (Birth order-2) 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
N 72,260 72,267 72,263 72,263 72,164
IV regression
E(JSY=1|Birth order-2) 0.593*** 0.814*** 0.720*** 0.800***
(0.112) (0.091) (0.097) (0.120)
N 72,260 72,256 72,256 72,157
With covariates
OLS regression
z=1[Birth order≤2] 0.087*** -0.002 0.025** 0.019*** 0.019*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
z× (Birth order-2) 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.008 0.001 0.005
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
N 68,220 68,226 68,224 68,222 68,127
IV regression
E(JSY=1|Birth order-2) 0.196** 0.227*** 0.144*** 0.173***
(0.078) (0.030) (0.021) (0.015)
N 68,220 68,216 68,216 68,121
Note: Using FRD design, we estimate discontinuities and kinks in the probabilities of receiving JSY, at least one ANC service,
institutional delivery service, at least one PNC service for mother and at least one PNC service for baby, at birth order 2. The
coefficients of dummy instrument, z, and the coefficients of its interaction with the forcing variable, z× (Birth order-2), are
estimates of discontinuities and kinks respectively. They come from local linear regressions of reduced form equations of JSY
dummy and dummies for four main outcomes, within birth order 1 and 7. The coefficients ofE(JSY=1|Birth order-2) are LATE
estimates, which come from second stage regressions of those outcomes. We see that when we add all other covariates under
sample 2, in addition to (Birth order-2), in regressions, LATE estimates dramatically reduce. Robust standard errors estimated
after the adjustment of birth order clusters are in parentheses. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
Now, we consider the local linear (OLS) regression of JSY dummy on z=1[Birth order≤2], z×
(Birth order-2) and (Birth order-2) as the first stage regression where z=1[Birth order≤2] and z× (Birth
order-2) are instruments, and we take the predicted value of JSY dummy, E(JSY=1|Birth order-2), from
that regression and use it in the second stage (OLS) regressions where those four outcomes are run on
E(JSY=1|Birth order-2) and Birth order-2. We show only the coefficients of E(JSY=1|Birth order-2),
which are estimates of LATEs, under the ‘without covariates’ option. They are very high, as they are
biased by kinks in covariates. After adding covariates under sample 2 in both the first and second stage
regressions, estimates of LATEs become reasonable, as now they are corrected from the effects of those
covariates. Compared to almost all previous estimates of ATTs, they are much higher. For example, in the
case of institutional delivery, estimates of ATTs (under sample 2) were around 16 percentage points, but
now the estimate of LATE (with covariates option) is 22.7 percentage points. As we said earlier, the FRD
design estimates causal effects for a sub-group called compliers, and it can produce higher estimates than
that of ATTs. However, we do not exclude results (with covariates) from our FRD design.
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7. Heterogeneous Effects
The effects of JSY can be different for different sub-groups of women. Policy makers may need to
know which sub-group of women is affected by JSY, and by how much. In general, the effects of JSY
vary with wealth of a woman’s household (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016),
health institution type where a woman gave her last birth (Powell-Jackson et al., 2015) and state (Lim
et al., 2010). They can also be changed by time because day by day knowledge about the program and
health care services increases with economic development, and that can affect estimates of ATTs. In this
section, estimates of ATTs for different wealth percentiles, years of last deliveries, states and places of
last deliveries are shown and results for four main outcomes are presented. All ATTs are estimated by
using the same specification of the logit regression and the same matching technique (e.g., third nearest
neighbors) as under sample 2 option in the results section.
7.1. Effects by Wealth Percentile
Households are divided into five groups based on the five ranges of the percentile of wealth index,
such as, wealth index≤ 20th percentile, 20th percentile<wealth index≤ 40th percentile, 40th percentile<wealth
index≤ 60th percentile, 60th percentile<wealth index≤ 80th percentile, and wealth index> 80th per-
centile. Households with wealth index ≤ 20th percentile are considered as the poorest group, and house-
holds with wealth index > 80th percentile are considered as the richest group. In Figure (3), we plot
estimates of ATTs for four main outcomes of these five groups of households. We can see that on average
JSY’s effects on these outcomes decrease as wealth increases. From the lowest wealth group (0-20) to the
second lowest wealth group (20-40), results sharply decline in all cases. From the second lowest wealth
group (20-40) to the middle wealth group (40-60), there are moderate declines of effects in all cases ex-
cept at least one PNC for mother, but after that, both declines and increases are seen. The pattern of these
results is consistent with that in Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) and Nandi and Laxminarayan (2016).
Figure 3: Effects of JSY on main outcomes by percentile of wealth index
7.2. Effects by Year of Last Birth
In Figure (4), we plot estimates of ATTs for four main outcomes by year of last (live) birth. We do
not see any clear relation of ATTs with time. Probably, over time, exposures of both treatment and control
women to the health facilities have increased in the same proportion, and therefore, ATTs remain stable.
Figure 4: Effects of JSY on main outcomes by year of last birth
7.3. Effects by State
JSY’s effects (e.g., estimates of ATTs) have high variations across states. In Figure (5), four states
– Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, and Tripura, show the highest effects of JSY on four main
outcomes. These are similar types of state located in the north-east of the country. It may be the case that
health workers are highly active in those states. Another reason might be that they are relatively backward
states. In advanced states, such as Kerala, Karnataka, Tamilnadu, Puducherry, and Telangana, ATTs are
very low. In these states, health facilities are better than those in relatively backward states, and exposure
of both treatment and control women to the health facilities is also higher than in relatively backward
states. In the figure, ATTs for one state, Goa, and two union territories, Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
and Chandigarh are not shown due to their small sample size.
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Figure 5: Effects of JSY on main outcomes by state
Table 10: Effects of JSY on main outcomes by institution type
At least Institutional At least one At least one
one ANC delivery PNC for mother PNC for baby
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JSY×Sub-health Center (SHC) 0.123*** 0.310*** 0.152*** 0.121***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019)
JSY×Primary Health Center (PHC) 0.104*** 0.270*** 0.162*** 0.115***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
JSY×Community Health Center (CHC) 0.113*** 0.285*** 0.161*** 0.148***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
JSY×United Health Center (UHC) 0.097*** 0.213*** 0.195*** 0.151***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.012)
JSY×Sub-district/District Hospital (SDH/DH) 0.112*** 0.272*** 0.155*** 0.114***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
JSY×Private Hospital 0.074*** 0.186*** 0.130*** 0.101***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
R2 0.204 0.325 0.227 0.244
N 55,528 55,528 55,524 55,442
Note: Separate OLS regressions of the above outcomes are run on all covariates in sample 2 plus the above interactions. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01. Coefficients of interactions between JSY dummy and
institution type are treatment effect parameters by institution type. Base categories include home deliveries and institutional
deliveries in other private and NGO operated health institutions.
7.4. Effects by Health Institution
Here women are categorized by the place of last delivery. Using PSM technique, different estimates
of ATTs are not possible for different health facilities, especially in the case of institutional delivery,
because this variable does not have any variation (e.g., only 1, not any 0). We run OLS regressions of
four outcomes on the interactions of JSY dummy and health institution dummies plus all covariates in
sample 2. It should be noted that both OLS and PSM produce almost the same results, as we checked in
our original analysis. We take interactions of JSY dummy with all types of main public health facilities
such as sub-health center (SHC), primary health center (PHC), community health center (CHC), united
health center (UHC) and sub-district/district hospital (SDH/DH), and private hospital. Base categories are
other small public and private health facilities such as dispensary and NGO-operated health facility, and
home delivery. Table (10) shows regression results of those interactions only (to note, here sample sizes
are lower than before because there are missing values in the place of delivery).
If we compare results between public and private health facilities, we see that all public health
facilities have higher effects of JSY than private hospitals. These results are consistent with those found by
Powell-Jackson et al. (2015). JSY has the highest effect on institutional delivery at SHC (31.0 percentage
points) where delivery cost is the lowest as shown in Table (2) because it provides very basic care, with
no obstetric care. Although delivery cost is the highest in sub-district/district hospital among all public
health facilities, the effect of JSY on institutional delivery at this hospital is not that low (27.2 percentage
points). This public hospital, located in a sub-district/district town, can provide obstetric care services.
It has qualified doctors and modern machines. Results imply that JSY women not only seek institutional
delivery services but also look for quality of care, which can be provided by sub-district/district hospital.
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8. Conclusion
JSY is one of the leading conditional cash transfer programs in the world covering more than 11
million women annually. This paper analyses the effects of the program on the utilization of several MCHC
services under the continuum of care. We have made significant contributions in the evaluation of JSY.
Leading studies on JSY (Nandi and Laxminarayan, 2016; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Lim et al., 2010;
Carvalho et al., 2014; Sengupta and Sinha, 2018), that explored causal effects, used DLHS-3, surveyed
in 2007-2008. Although JSY was launched in 2005, its budget was allocated in 2006, and it started
its operation in 2007-2008. Many women in DLHS-3, who gave birth before 2007, responded as JSY
beneficiaries when they were not (Das et al., 2011). They were probably beneficiaries of other programs
run at state level. So, the treatment statuses of the treated women in DLHS-3 suffer from measurement
errors, and thus, the treatment dummy is endogenous there. The control statuses of the control women are
less likely to suffer from the measurement errors, so such errors are one-sided, and therefore, they are not
random. In this situation, if one considers even instrumental variables regression to remove endogeneity
bias, the bias will not go away.
Because of the above measurement errors, the average outcomes of the treatment group were under-
estimated, and those previous studies produced downward biased results. In this study, we use DLHS-4,
surveyed in 2013-2014. DLHS-4 surveyed women who gave birth from 2008 to the survey time. As JSY
was operated at that time, we assume that women responded correctly to the question – whether you were
selected by JSY. If any woman responded as a beneficiary of another program, we have excluded her from
the data. In this way, our treatment group includes actual JSY women, and thus, there is little chance of
downward biased results. Also, at the survey time of DLHS-4, JSY was mature enough, and well known
by women, and we envisage there is less selection bias in DLHS-4. Although we have used PSM tech-
nique, we have used it rigorously. Several robust analyses, including ignorability check, are carried out
which have implied our results are robust. However, there always remains a chance of endogeneity bias,
and we, therefore, apply FRD design exploiting birth order cutoff.
While PSM produces reasonable estimates of treatment effects, FRD design gives us relatively
higher effects of JSY. Both methods provide us with higher estimates of treatment effects than those found
in previous studies. For example, according to PSM’s ATT estimates, women in the treatment group are
15.7 percentage points more likely to take up institutional delivery service, 10.1 percentage points more
likely to take up at least one ANC service, 12.2 percentage points more likely to take up at least one PNC
service and 8.6 percentage points more likely to take up at least one PNC service for newborns. When
we apply FRD design, these estimates become 22.7, 19.6, 14.4 and17.3 percentage points respectively.
These higher estimates are anticipated, as they are LATE estimates which are estimates of treatment ef-
fects for a sub-group called compliers. On the other hand, due to JSY, Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) found
7.5 percentage points increase in the uptake of institutional delivery service, but no statistically significant
increase in the uptake of ANC service. However, our LATE estimates are also in line with those found in
other countries. For example, using regression discontinuity design, De Brauw et al. (2011) found that El
Salvador’s DSF program, Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, increased the uptake of institutional delivery
service by 15.3-22.8 percentage points.
Using PSM, we also find reasonable effects of JSY on the uptake of individual ANC services (4.8-
12.5 percentage points) and PNC services (3.4-13.6 percentage points excluding “Days of first breast-
feeding”), but relatively lower effects on the uptakes of immunizations (1.6-9.4 percentage points). The
government has several other programs to increase the number of immunized children. Without the JSY
program, the uptake of immunizations is already high, and the program has little scope to improve this.
Considering this fact, increases in immunizations due to JSY can be considered as high.
We also find that JSY women in the lowest wealth group and poorer states are most likely to utilize
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MCHC services. So, if the government can minimize the targeting errors (by reaching more disadvan-
taged women), the program’s impact may increase greatly. As Powell-Jackson et al. (2015) found, JSY
also contributes to crowding-out of the private sector. Among public health facilities, the program has the
lowest contribution to the delivery cost in sub-district/district hospitals where the JSY women are 27.2 per-
centage points (third highest compared to other public health facilities) more likely to go for institutional
delivery services. JSY also increases the demand for quality of care, which can be provided more easily
by sub-district/district hospitals than other lower/primary public health facilities. If the government can
improve the quality of care by managing cheaper services, the program can further increase the utilization
of MCHC services.
In advanced settings, investments in motherhood and early childhood have been found useful in
yielding a high economic and social return in the future. For example, Early Childhood Care and Education
from the Head Start program in the USA have improved children’s immediate and near future levels of
nutrition and health screening, which in turn have improved their productivity and thus economic activities
(Belfield and Kelly, 2013). The UK Government has invested in the antenatal and early years through a
large-scale pilot program, the Nurse-Family Partnership, which has generated returns to the individuals
regarding increased earnings, higher education, improved physical and mental well-being (Doyle et al.,
2009). Such findings are not typical in developing countries. No studies have focused on the future returns
of JSY and we do not have scope to do that. However, we can argue that since JSY increases the utilization
of ANC services, institutional deliveries, PNC services, and immunizations, the productivity of children
born to JSY women is likely to grow in the future.
As DLHS-4 has less chance of misclassification of control women as treated, our results have less
downward biases. However, this survey also has a limitation. It is not a nationally representative survey,
and therefore, our analysis is neither nationally representative nor externally valid for non-DLHS-4 states.
Using the Annual Health Survey or National Family Health Survey, an analysis is possible for non-DLHS-
4 or high focus states too, but JSY is universal in those states as all women delivering at public or accredited
private hospitals are eligible for JSY benefits as if it is a different program in those states. That analysis
would require different research designs such as Difference-in-Difference technique, which is beyond the
scope of this paper and we leave such analysis for future research. Although DLHS-4 is not a nationally
representative survey, our results are closer to true or nationally representative effects of JSY compared to
that found in the previous prominent studies using nationally representative data such as DLHS-3, as our
results are higher than those found in previous studies. Also, our results for Nagaland and Tripura close
correspond to results for low performing states.
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Appendix A .
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of covariates
JSY NonJSY
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Diff. p value
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household has below poverty line card (1 yes, 0 no) 0.469 15,841 0.318 57,220 0.151 <0.0001
Household has scheduled caste affiliation (1 yes, 0 no) 0.310 15,144 0.221 53,925 0.089 <0.0001
Household has tribal affiliation (1 yes, 0 no) 0.177 15,837 0.176 57,159 0.002 0.596
Current age of woman/mother 23.854 15,844 25.047 57,239 -1.193 <0.0001
Birth order/parity 1.842 15,788 2.163 56,796 -0.320 <0.0001
Wealth Index -0.654 15,838 -0.016 57,204 -0.639 <00001
Highest years of education taken by woman/mother 8.675 13,665 9.563 47,616 -0.888 <0.0001
Highest years of education taken by husband 8.812 14,032 9.821 50,431 -1.009 <0.0001
Religion: Hindu (1 yes, 0 no) 0.698 15,842 0.653 57,223 0.045 <0.0001
Residence: Rural (1 yes, 0 no) 0.683 15,844 0.593 57,239 0.090 <0.0001
Note: Birth year dummies and state dummies were also used as covariates, but they are not reported here.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
JSY NonJSY
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Diff. p value
Outcome Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main outcomes
At least one ANC (1 yes, 0 no) 0.949 15,844 0.826 57,239 0.122 <0.0001
Institutional delivery (1 yes, 0 no) 0.935 15,843 0.773 57,236 0.162 <0.0001
At least one PNC for mother (1 yes, 0 no) 0.747 15,844 0.632 57,234 0.115 <0.0001
At least one PNC for baby (1 yes, 0 no) 0.824 15,770 0.741 56,708 0.084 <0.0001
ANC services
Weight measured (1 yes, 0 no) 0.872 15,835 0.742 57,207 0.130 <0.0001
Height measured (1 yes, 0 no) 0.512 15,835 0.420 57,207 0.092 <0.0001
Blood pressure checked (1 yes, 0 no) 0.806 15,835 0.671 57,207 0.136 <0.0001
Blood tested (haemoglobin) (1 yes, 0 no) 0.717 15,835 0.613 57,207 0.104 <0.0001
Blood tested (blood group) (1 yes, 0 no) 0.648 15,835 0.544 57,207 0.105 <0.0001
Urine tested (1 yes, 0 no) 0.783 15,835 0.667 57,207 0.117 <0.0001
Abdomen examined (1 yes, 0 no) 0.574 15,835 0.485 57,207 0.088 <0.0001
Breast examined (1 yes, 0 no) 0.352 15,835 0.311 57,207 0.041 <0.0001
Ultrasound done (1 yes, 0 no) 0.634 15,835 0.581 57,207 0.053 <0.0001
Iron Folic Acid tablet/syrup (1 yes, 0 no) 0.795 15,844 0.633 57,239 0.162 <0.0001
At least one tetanus injection (1 yes, 0 no) 0.921 15,842 0.788 57,230 0.133 <0.0001
PNC services for mother
Abdomen examined (1 yes, 0 no) 0.495 15,841 0.387 57,228 0.108 <0.0001
Advice on breastfeeding (1 yes, 0 no) 0.501 15,841 0.386 57,228 0.116 <0.0001
Advice on baby care (1 yes, 0 no) 0.468 15,841 0.373 57,228 0.095 <0.0001
Advice on Family Planning (1 yes, 0 no) 0.341 15,841 0.249 57,228 0.092 <0.0001
PNC services for baby
Weight taken at birth (1 yes, 0 no) 0.918 15,769 0.754 56,708 0.164 <0.0001
Days of first breastfeeding 1.450 15,769 1.567 56,698 -0.117 <0.0001
Advice on infant diarrhoea (1 yes, 0 no) 0.551 15,842 0.566 57,226 -0.015 0.001
Advice on infant pneumonia (1 yes, 0 no) 0.284 15,843 0.312 57,234 -0.029 <0.0001
Immunizations for baby
BCG (1 yes, 0 no) 0.971 7,779 0.945 32,573 0.027 <0.0001
Polio (1 yes, 0 no) 0.973 7,782 0.956 32,571 0.017 <0.0001
First Polio in two weeks of birth (1 yes, 0 no) 0.807 7,782 0.738 32,574 0.069 <0.0001
DPT (1 yes, 0 no) 0.906 7,782 0.860 32,570 0.046 <0.0001
Measles (1 yes, 0 no) 0.865 7,781 0.805 32,570 0.060 <0.0001
Hepatitis-B (1 yes, 0 no) 0.773 15,721 0.684 56,488 0.089 <0.0001
Vitamin-A (1 yes, 0 no) 0.665 15,723 0.599 56,490 0.066 <0.0001
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Table A.3: Logit regression of JSY dummy on covariates
Dep var: Log-odds ratio of JSY
Outcome type 1 Outcome type 2
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 Sample 2
Robust Robust Robust Robust
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Household has below poverty line card 0.465*** (0.026) 0.474*** (0.023) 0.399*** (0.036) 0.407*** (0.032)
Household has scheduled caste affiliation 0.458*** (0.027) 0.429*** (0.024) 0.359*** (0.037) 0.334*** (0.032)
Household has tribal affiliation 0.137*** (0.050) 0.113*** (0.043) 0.154** (0.070) 0.099 (0.061)
Current age of woman/mother -0.006** (0.003) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.003)
Birth order/parity -0.308*** (0.014) -0.307*** (0.011) -0.234*** (0.018) -0.243*** (0.015)
Wealth Index -0.094*** (0.008) -0.099*** (0.006) -0.102*** (0.011) -0.115*** (0.008)
Highest years of education taken by woman -0.019*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.005)
Highest years of education taken by husband -0.029*** (0.004) -0.022*** (0.005)
Religion: Hindu 0.146*** (0.030) 0.123*** (0.027) 0.103** (0.042) 0.097*** (0.037)
Residence: Rural 0.306*** (0.025) 0.335*** (0.023) 0.333*** (0.035) 0.355*** (0.032)
Birth year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.104 0.097 0.090
N 54,656 68,527 30,372 38,332
Note: In this Table, coefficients imply the changes in log-odds ratio of JSY dummy. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01. Birth
year dummies and state dummies were also used in the above logit regressions, but their coefficients (e.g., changes in log-odds
ratio of JSY dummy) are not reported here.
(a) Sample 1 for outcome type 1 (b) Sample 2 for outcome type 1
(c) Sample 1 for outcome type 2 (d) Sample 2 for outcome type 2
Note: After running four representative logit models in Table (A.3), we estimate four sets of standardized % biases between
treatment and control groups across covariates after matching and four sets of such biases without matching. We show biases in
horizontal axes. Vertical axes represent lists of covariates, but they are not seen because of long lists. After matching, all biases
fall within two dashed vertical lines at -10 and 10. We can say that covariates are balanced after matching, in all four cases.
Figure A.1: Before and after matching percentage biases in covariates between treatment and control
groups
(a) Sample 1 for outcome type 1 (b) Sample 2 for outcome type 1
(c) Sample 1 for outcome type 2 (d) Sample 2 for outcome type 2
Note: After running four representative logit models in Table (A.3), we estimate four sets of propensity scores for the treatment
group and four sets of propensity scores for the control group. We show propensity scores in the horizontal axes and their
densities in the vertical axes. In each of four subfigures, if the propensity score of the control group tends to zero, the density
becomes higher. In no subfigure, the overlap condition is satisfied. In this situation, we drop observations if the propensity
score is less than 0.10.
Figure A.2: Density of the propensity score, Pr(JSY = 1|X), for treatment group (JSY = 1) and
control group (JSY = 0)
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Table A.4: Comparisons of mean outcomes between two control groups (eligible non-participants and
ineligibles) as an unconfoundedness check
Sample 1 Sample 2
Outcome Variables Coeff. p value Obs. Coeff. p value Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Main outcomes
At least one ANC -0.010 (0.127) 45,335 -0.010 (0.105 ) 56,992
Institutional delivery -0.017*** (0.010) 45,332 -0.027*** (0.000) 56,988
At least one PNC for mother -0.001 (0.941) 45,331 -0.017** (0.015) 56,988
At least one PNC for baby -0.018** (0.016) 45,278 -0.021*** (0.002) 56,907
ANC services
Weight measured -0.026*** (0.001) 45,306 -0.031*** (0.000) 56,961
Height measured -0.015* (0.073) 45,306 -0.018*** (0.009) 56,961
Blood pressure checked -0.026*** (0.002) 45,306 -0.028*** (0.000) 56,961
Blood tested (haemoglobin) -0.009 (0.300) 45,306 -0.019*** (0.007) 56,961
Blood tested (blood group) -0.020** ( 0.015) 45,306 -0.027*** (0.000) 56,961
Urine tested 0.008 (0.305) 45,306 -0.002 (0.792) 56,961
Abdomen examined -0.024*** (0.006) 45,306 -0.032*** ( 0.000) 56,961
Breast examined -0.014* (0.084) 45,306 -0.024*** (0.000) 56,961
Ultrasound done -0.007 (0.413) 45,306 -0.022*** (0.002) 56961
Iron Folic Acid tablet/syrup -0.015* (0.066) 45,335 -0.022*** (0.002) 56,992
At least one tetanus injection -0.015** (0.036) 45,327 -0.017*** (0.009) 56,983
PNC services for mother
Abdomen examined -0.013 (0.117) 45,326 -0.022*** (0.001) 56,979
Advice on breastfeeding -0.015* (0.066) 45,326 -0.027*** (0.000) 56,979
Advice on baby care -0.017** (0.037) 45,326 -0.029*** (0.000) 56,979
Advice on Family Planning 0.000 (0.960) ) 45,326 -0.008 (0.232) 56,979
PNC services for baby
Weight taken at birth -0.003 (0.668) 45,277 -0.020*** (0.002) 56,906
Days of first breastfeeding 0.009 (0.560) 45,269 0.015 (0.253) 56,897
Advice on infant diarrhoea -0.015* (0.088) 45,326 -0.018** (0.020) 56,980
Advice on infant pneumonia 0.003 (0.723) 45,330 -0.002 (0.828) 56,987
Immunizations for baby
BCG 0.013** (0.031) 25,908 0.012** (0.035) 32,755
Polio 0.001 (0.788) 25,907 0.005 (0.308) 32,753
First Polio in two weeks of birth -0.022** (0.032) 25,910 -0.017* (0.062) 32,756
DPT -0.007 (0.408) 25,905 -0.002 (0.825) 32,752
Measles 0.002 (0.810) 25,905 0.006 (0.487) 32,752
Hepatitis-B 0.007 (0.417) 45,053 0.000 (0.997) 56,618
Vitamin-A 0.004 (0.653) 45,057 0.000 (0.993) 56,621
Note: Coefficients are estimated by running separate OLS regressions of outcomes on the dummy for two control groups (1
if eligible non-participants, 0 ineligibles) and respective covariates under sample 1 and sample 2. In columns (1) and (4), we
show the coefficients of the dummy for the control group, for sample 1 and sample 2 respectively. p values from robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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Table A.5: Mantel and Haenszel (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) test statistics for four main outcome vari-
ables
At least one ANC Institutional Delivery
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 Sample 2
γ Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh−
1.0 23.7 23.7 0.000 0.000 31.1 31.1 0.000 0.000 31.2 31.2 0.000 0.000 39.6 39.6 0.000 0.000
1.1 21.5 25.9 0.000 0.000 28.4 33.8 0.000 0.000 28.8 33.7 0.000 0.000 36.5 42.6 0.000 0.000
1.2 19.6 28.0 0.000 0.000 26.1 36.3 0.000 0.000 26.6 36.0 0.000 0.000 33.9 45.5 0.000 0.000
1.3 17.8 29.9 0.000 0.000 23.9 38.6 0.000 0.000 24.6 38.2 0.000 0.000 31.4 48.1 0.000 0.000
1.4 16.2 31.7 0.000 0.000 22.0 40.9 0.000 0.000 22.8 40.2 0.000 0.000 29.2 50.6 0.000 0.000
1.5 14.7 33.4 0.000 0.000 20.1 42.9 0.000 0.000 21.2 42.2 0.000 0.000 27.1 53.0 0.000 0.000
1.6 13.3 35.1 0.000 0.000 18.5 44.9 0.000 0.000 19.6 44.0 0.000 0.000 25.2 55.3 0.000 0.000
1.7 12.1 36.6 0.000 0.000 16.9 46.8 0.000 0.000 18.2 45.8 0.000 0.000 23.4 57.4 0.000 0.000
1.8 10.9 38.1 0.000 0.000 15.4 48.7 0.000 0.000 16.9 47.5 0.000 0.000 21.8 59.5 0.000 0.000
1.9 9.7 39.6 0.000 0.000 14.1 50.4 0.000 0.000 15.6 49.1 0.000 0.000 20.2 61.4 0.000 0.000
2.0 8.7 40.9 0.000 0.000 12.8 52.1 0.000 0.000 14.4 50.6 0.000 0.000 18.8 63.3 0.000 0.000
At least one PNC for mother At least one PNC for baby
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 Sample 2
γ Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh− Qmh+ Qmh− pmh+ pmh−
1.0 16.1 16.1 0.000 0.000 22.7 22.7 0.000 0.000 12.2 12.2 0.000 0.000 18.6 18.6 0.000 0.000
1.1 12.4 19.8 0.000 0.000 18.5 26.9 0.000 0.000 9.0 15.4 0.000 0.000 14.9 22.3 0.000 0.000
1.2 9.0 23.2 0.000 0.000 14.7 30.8 0.000 0.000 6.1 18.4 0.000 0.000 11.5 25.7 0.000 0.000
1.3 5.9 26.3 0.000 0.000 11.2 34.4 0.000 0.000 3.4 21.2 0.000 0.000 8.4 28.9 0.000 0.000
1.4 3.1 29.2 0.001 0.000 8.0 37.7 0.000 0.000 0.9 23.7 0.186 0.000 5.6 31.9 0.000 0.000
1.5 0.4 32.0 0.339 0.000 5.0 40.8 0.000 0.000 1.4 26.1 0.082 0.000 2.9 34.6 0.002 0.000
1.6 2.0 34.5 0.021 0.000 2.2 43.7 0.014 0.000 3.6 28.4 0.000 0.000 0.4 37.3 0.336 0.000
1.7 4.4 37.0 0.000 0.000 0.4 46.5 0.344 0.000 5.6 30.5 0.000 0.000 1.9 39.7 0.030 0.000
1.8 6.6 39.3 0.000 0.000 2.9 49.1 0.002 0.000 7.5 32.5 0.000 0.000 4.1 42.1 0.000 0.000
1.9 8.7 41.4 0.000 0.000 5.2 51.6 0.000 0.000 9.3 34.5 0.000 0.000 6.2 44.3 0.000 0.000
2.0 10.6 43.5 0.000 0.000 7.5 53.9 0.000 0.000 11.1 36.3 0.000 0.000 8.1 46.4 0.000 0.000
γ : Odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors
Qmh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect)
Qmh− : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect)
pmh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect)
pmh− : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect)
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Highlights 
• We estimate the effects of conditional cash transfer program, Janani Suraksha Yojana, 
on the utilization of maternal and child health services in India. 
• We apply both propensity score matching (PSM) and fuzzy regression discontinuity 
(FRD) design. 
• According to PSM, program beneficiaries are around 16 percentage points more likely 
to have institutional deliveries. 
• When we apply FRD design, that estimate becomes around 23 percentage points. 
• Effects of JSY vary by state, wealth, and the place of birth. 
